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Are Generics Especially Pernicious?1  
In recent years, both within and outside philosophy, the idea has taken hold that generics play a 
special role in perpetuating social injustice.  Sarah--DQH/HVOLH¶VZRUNLeslie forthcoming; 
Rhodes, Leslie and Tworek 2012; Wodak, Leslie and Rhodes 2015DQG6DOO\+DVODQJHU¶V
building on it (Haslanger 2011), had led to an increasingly widespread belief that the use of 
generic expressions plays a crucial role in passing on and shoring up racist and sexist beliefs.  I 
have started to hear feminists catching themselves using generic terms to describe social 
JURXSVDQGWU\LQJWRUHSKUDVHWKHLUXWWHUDQFHVDWFRQIHUHQFHVFLWLQJ+DVODQJHU¶VDQG/HVOLH¶V
work as the reason. But, as I will explain here, I think we do not yet have good reason to think 
that we should single out generics about social groups out as peculiarly destructive, or that we 
should strive to eradicate them from our usage. Indeed, I think they continue to serve a very 
valuable purpose and we should not rush to condemn them.  
I view the current attention to generics as a mistake in the battle against prejudice. This is not 
because they pose no problems²they do pose problems (though I am not yet convinced about 
many of the problems claimed by Leslie and Haslanger). But so do many other closely related 
constructions. If we focus our energies on avoiding generics, substituting other phrases that we 
(wrongly) take to be innocuous, we will be making a serious error. Instead, we need to think 
much harder about how to confront many sorts of utterances which make reference to social 
groups.  
1. Striking Property Generics  
7KHIRFXVRIP\GLVFXVVLRQZLOOEHPDLQO\RQWKHJHQHULFVWKDW/HVOLHGXEV³6WULNLQJ3URSHUW\
*HQHULFV´+RZHYHUVRPHRIWKHFRQFHUQVUDLVHGZLOOEH relevant to other generics as well. 
Striking property generics are especially puzzling, and (we will see) especially politically 
interesting. Consider (1) and (2) below, from Leslie (forthcoming):  
(1)  Mosquitoes carry West Nile Virus. ͒ 
(2) Books are paperbacks. ͒ 
Intuitively, (1) is true and (2) is false. But on reflection these intuitions are very puzzling: only a 
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 This paper was for some time delivered and circulated DV³*HQHULFVGRQ¶W(VVHQWLDOLVH People; 
3HRSOH(VVHQWLDOLVH3HRSOH´. 
tiny minority of mosquitoes (less than 1%) carry West Nile Virus, and the overwhelming majority 
of books (around 70%) are paperbacks. Leslie calls generic claims like (1)²which attribute 
particularly dangerous properties ² µ6WULNLQJ3URSHUW\*HQHULFV¶6WULNLQJSURSHUW\JHQHULFFODLPV
are readily accepted on the basis of just a few instances, and often just one.  
Importantly, however, not all claims which attribute dangerous properties are so readily 
accepted. Learning that an office chair exploded with fatal consequences 
(http://unusualdeaths.com/2014/03/23/boy-killed-when-office-chair-exploded/) does not make 
people inclined to accept (3):  
(3)  Office chairs explode.͒ 
Yet learning about a single dramatic act of terrorism by a Muslim might well (as Leslie notes) 
lead people to accept (4):  
(4)  Muslims are terrorists. 
So how does this work?  
According to Leslie, one necessary condiWLRQERWKIRUSHRSOH¶VDFFHSWDQFHRID6WULNLQJ3URSHUW\
*HQHULFFODLPDQGIRULWVWUXWKLVWKDWEHLQJDPHPEHURIWKHNLQGPXVWEHD³JRRGSUHGLFWRU´RI
having the dangerous property attributed. Here is how she cashes that out:  
³,WPDWWHUVWKHQIRUWKHWUXWKRIµPRVTXLWRHVFDUU\WKH:HVW1LOH9LUXV¶WKDWWKHYLUXV- free 
PRVTXLWRHVZLOOFDUU\WKHYLUXVLIFLUFXPVWDQFHVDOORZµ6KDUNVDWWDFNEDWKHUV¶LVWUXHRQO\LIWKH
sharks that never in fact cause harm to humans would typically do so given half a chance, and 
VRRQ´/HVOLHIRUWKFRPLQJ  
  
1RERG\ZRXOGHYHUWKLQNWKDWRIILFHFKDLUVKDYHDGLVSRVLWLRQWRH[SORGH³LIJLYHQKDOIDFKDQFH´
VRWKLVQLFHO\H[SODLQVZK\ZH¶UHQRWWHPSWHGE\WKHFODLP³RIILFHFKDLUVDUHGDQJHURXV´ 
%XW/HVOLHQRWHVZHGRQ¶WKDYHYHU\JRRGGLUHFWDFFHVVWRZKDWPDQ\NLQGVRIWKLQJVDUH
disposed to do. So, she suggests, we rely on various heuristics. One thing we do is to look for 
kinds for which we think that ³WKHUHLVVRPHKLGGHQQRQ- obvious, and persistent property or 
underlying nature shared by members of that kind, which causally grounds their common 
SURSHUWLHVDQGGLVSRVLWLRQV´/HVOLHIRUWKFRPLQJ We do think that mosquitoes are like this. 
:HGRQ¶WWKLQNWKDWflying things are, which expODLQVZK\ZH¶UHPXFKPRUHOLNHO\WRDFFHSWWKDW
mosquitoes carry West Nile Virus than that flying things do. Those kinds that we think of as 
KDYLQJVXFKDVKDUHGQDWXUHDUHZKDW/HVOLHFDOOV³HVVHQWLDOLVHGNLQGV´DQGVRFLDOJURXSVWKDW
we take to have an essence are essentialised social groups.  
We only accept striking property generics as true, Leslie suggests, when the kinds or social 
groups they are about are essentialised. However, this is not sufficient for their truth. For striking 
property generic claims to be true²rather than just commonly accepted as true²it actually 
needs to be the case that being a member of the kind is a good predictor of possessing the 
property. And this, in turn, most likely requires that the kind genuinely be essentialised. Now we 
DUHLQDSRVLWLRQWRXQGHUVWDQG/HVOLH¶VVWRU\DERXWZK\ERWKDQGDUHIDOVHDQGZK\
people make errors in thinking about (4).  
(3) Office chairs explode.  
(4) Muslims are terrorists.͒ 
Both of these claims are false because being a member of the kind is a poor predictor of the 
SURSHUW\LQTXHVWLRQ$FFRUGLQJWR/HVOLHDNH\WRSHRSOH¶Vbelief that (4) is true is that they take 
Muslims to be an essentialised kind. They use membership in an essentialised kind as a proxy 
for deciding whether kind membership is a good predictor of the property, so these people 
wrongly take (4) to be true. In the case of (3) we are not tempted to make such errors. First, we 
GRQ¶WWKLQNRIRIILFHFKDLUVDVDQHVVHQWLDOLVHGNLQG²while they share many properties, these 
properties are all rather obvious, rather than hidden. Next, we have so much experience with 
non-exploding office chairs that we are not even for a second tempted by the thought that being 
an office chair is a good predictor of exploding. (Note that those who, for example, live in 
majority Muslim nations will be similarly untempted by (4).)  
In short, Leslie takes there to be two conditions that bring about our ready acceptance of striking 
property generics about Fs. We must think of Fs as an essentialised kind, and we must think that 
being an F is a good predictor of having the striking property attributed by the generic. When 
these conditions are met, striking property generics are readily accepted. This is why, according 
to Leslie and Haslanger, they are particularly pernicious for perpetuating false beliefs and 
discriminatory behavior regarding social groups that are stigmatized as dangerous. Each author 
presents slightly different stories about this, which I will take in turn.  
2. Haslanger  
The striking property generic claim on which Haslanger focuses most of her attention is (5):  
(5)  Blacks are violent.͒ 
She notes (following Leslie) that because not many instances are required for the truth of a 
striking property generic claim, people may accept this as true very readily. Haslanger herself 
wants to reserve judgment on the truth of (5), largely because she does not want to commit 
herself to a particular theory of the truth conditions for striking property generics. Instead, 
Haslanger notes that (5) is either false or true but very misleading.2 (Leslie holds that it is 
definitely false because blacks are not GLVSRVHGWREHYLROHQW³JLYHQKDOIDFKDQFH´ZKLFKLV
what she requires.3)  
However, Haslanger argues that even if (5) is true, it should be denied. This seems paradoxical, 
but Haslanger argues for the use of metalinguistic negation²a mechanism first discussed by 
Larry Horn (1985) which allows for the denial of true claims that are in some way badly put, such 
as in (6).  
(6)  )LGRGLGQ¶WVKLWRQWKHUXJKHKDGDOLWWOHDFFLGHQW͒ 
One use to which we often put metalinguistic negation is the denial of true statements with false 
implicatures.  
(7)  $:KDWGR\RXWKLQNRI=¶VSKLORVRSKLFDODELOLWLHV"͒ 
B: Well, he has very nice handwriting...͒ 
&1R%WKDW¶VZURQJ²KH¶VDQH[FHOOHQWSKLORVRSKHU 
Haslanger suggests that even if claims like (5) are true, they should be denied using 
metalinguistic negation, because they carry false and pernicious implicatures. In particular, she 
takes claims like these to carry implicatures about natures ² that there is something about the 
nature of blacks that makes them prone to violence. This is because striking property generics 
are, as we have seen, linked to essentialising beliefs about kinds. These sorts of beliefs about 
natures are a crucial part of the ideologies of racism, and communicating them without openly 
expressing them is a particularly pernicious way of propping up and disseminating these 
ideologies. Haslanger argues that if implicatures are not challenged they will be added to the 
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 The reason that she grants that (5) might be true, is because there might be a good explanation of black violence as 
a response to racist oppression, and this might supply a non-accidental connection that is sufficient to make (5) true.͒ 
3
 This is actually quite problematic for her when it comes to (1), which she wants to maintain is true. Mosquitoes are 
QRWGLVSRVHGWRFDUU\:HVW1LOH9LUXV³JLYHQKDOIDFKDQFH´²they need to be exposed to it. In fact, I share Rachel 
6WHUNHQ¶VZRUULHVDERXWZKHWKHU/HVOLHKDVRIIHUHGSODXVLEOHWUXWKFRQGLWLRQs for Striking Property Generics (Sterken 
2015 a, b). But here my focus is not on their truth conditions, but on whether they are particularly politically worrying. 
common ground of the conversation²the background assumptions that are taken for granted. 
Because these are in the background, they become especially difficult to draw attention to and 
challenge. Since the implicature of a claim like (5) is not only false but an extremely pernicious 
belief to add to the common ground, it must be challenged. Haslanger recommends doing so 
with metalinguistic negation, as in the responses below4:  
 1REODFNVDUHQ¶WYLROHQWPeople DUHYLROHQWZKHQWKH\¶UHSODFHGLQRSSUHVVLYHFLUFXPVWDQFHV
͒ 
 1REODFNVDUHQ¶WYLROHQW7KH\GRQ¶WVKDUHVRPHFRPPRQQDWXUHEXWLQIDFWDUHDVGLYHUVHDV
any other group of people. ͒ 
There is much that is right in this story, I think, but also much that is slightly off. ͒ 
A first, somewhat mistaken, worry is this: +DVODQJHU¶VIRFXVLVYHU\PXFKRQPHWDOLQJXLVWLF
negation rather than ordinary negation, even though she is not by any means committed to the 
truth of (5). One might expect her to say that if (5) is false, one should simply use ordinary 
negation. But a key SDUWRIKHUSRLQWLVWKDWZH¶UHQRWYHU\JRRGDWWKLQNLQJDERXWWKHWUXWK
conditions for generics. She herself is not sure what they are, and² perhaps even more 
importantly²we are sure to encounter many people who are convinced that (5) is true. Given all 
this, it may well be a good idea to use metalinguistic negation in order to block the addition of the 
implicated claim to the common ground. This way we can protest the ideology, while 
sidestepping a discussion of the truth conditions of generics.͒ 
However, there are still some problems. Chief among them is the fact that it seems unlikely that 
a claim about natures is conversationally implicated. In order for a claim to be conversationally 
implicated, it needs to be the case that one cannot make sense of the utterance as cooperative 
without assuming the claim to be believed by the speaker. But there will be very few contexts in 
which one needs to assume that the speaker has beliefs about the nature of black people in 
order to understand (5) as cooperative. $IWHUDOODV+DVODQJHUQRWHVZHGRQ¶WDFWXDOO\WDONRU
think explicitly about natures very often.  
Nonetheless, another conversational implicature is plausible, one about relevance. If a speaker 
utters (5), they would in fact be behaving very uncooperatively if blackness was irrelevant to 
violence. To understand the utterer of (5) as cooperative, we do need to assume that blackness 
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 +DVODQJHUGRHVQ¶WDFWXDOO\VXJJHVWSDUWLFXODUUHVSRQVHV7KHVHDUHP\WKRXJKWVRQKRZWKH metalinguistic negation 
might work. 
LVUHOHYDQWWRZKDWWKH\¶UHVD\LQJ, an implicature which does not include anything about natures. 
&RPSDUH:H¶GHDVLO\MXGJH DQXWWHUDQFHRI³3HRSOHZLWKWRQVLOVDUHYLROHQW´DVXQFRRSHUDWLYH
unless it turned out that there was a link between tonsils and violence.)  
But once we have allowed that this is the more plausible implicature story, generic constructions 
cease to be a part of that story. Any time race (or some other trait) is mentioned, there is 
arguably just the same sort of implicature that the trait in question is believed by the speaker to 
be relevant²DIWHUDOOLWZRXOGEHXQFRRSHUDWLYHWRPHQWLRQUDFHLILWZDVQ¶W thought to be 
UHOHYDQW7KLVZDVVWULNLQJO\GHPRQVWUDWHGIRUPHE\DORFDOVKRSNHHSHUZKRVSRWWHGP\³7KLV
LVZKDWDIHPLQLVWORRNVOLNH´EDJDQGGHFLGHGWRWHOOPHVRPHRIKHUVXSSRVHGO\IHPLQLVWEHOLHIV
She proceeded to utter (8) and (9).  
(8) Many Asian men are abusive to women. ͒ 
(9) 0\IULHQGKDVDIULHQGZKR¶V$VLDQDQGKH¶VDEXVLYHWRKLVZLIH͒ 
,IRXQGWKHVHXWWHUDQFHVYHU\GLVWXUELQJLW¶VXQGRXEWHGO\WUXHWKDWPDQ\$VLDQPHQDUHDEXVLYH
to women, as are many men from any ethnic group; and it may well be true that a friend of her 
friend is an Asian who is abusive to his wife. However, there was no reason to introduce 
ethnicity into the discussion. Her mention of Asian men suggested that somehow their being 
Asian was relevant to the abusiveness. 6RMXVWDVLQ+DVODQJHU¶VH[DPSOHWKHUHZRXOGVHHPWR
be the problematic implicature that being Asian is relevant to the dangerous property being 
attributed.  
Importantly, though, this example is one in which no generics are used: (8) and (9) do not 
include generics, and yet they carry the same sort of relevance implicature that is carried by (5). 
$OPRVWDQ\WLPHDUDFHRUHWKQLFLW\LVPHQWLRQHGWKHUHZLOOEHDQLPSOLFDWXUHWKDWLW¶VUHOHYDQWWR
the subject matter under discussion. More generally, if specific groups of people are introduced 
into a discussion there will be an implicature that these specific groups are relevant to the 
discussion. (There are exceptions, of course. Imagine a conversation among a team of social 
scientists hoping to learn about differences between groups with respect to some property P. 
They would report their findings about these groups and property P without any implicature that 
there was a relationship, since this is precisely what they are trying to find out.) Introducing 
racial, ethnic, and others groups into discussions in this way undoubtedly makes a contribution 
to the transmission of pernicious ideologies. However, Haslanger has not shown that generics 
play a particularly worrying role in this phenomenon.  
3. Leslie  
Sarah-Jane Leslie raises three concerns about generics that are importantly linked. The first 
concern is that our tendency to overly-easily accept striking property generic claims fuels hatred 
and violence against members of stigmatized social groups. The second is that the use of 
generics to discuss social groups leads people to be more likely to essentialise social groups. 
This matters, because essentialising social groups makes it far more likely that we will accept 
striking property generic claims about these groups. Her third worry is that use of labels leads to 
the essentialising of social groups.  
/HVOLH¶VSURSRVHGUHPHG\IRUWKHVHSUREOHPVLVWRDOWHURXUOLQJXLVWLFSUDFWLFHV:͒³7KHHYLGHQFH
strongly suggests that the use of labels and generics contribute to essentialization, and so we 
may expect that the converse will also hold: reducing the use of labels and generics for racial, 
ethnic, and religious groups may reduce the extent to which children grow up essentializing 
WKHVHJURXSV´/HVOLH)RUWKFRPLQJ)5  
I will be raising concerns about both her evidence that generics are pernicious, and her 
proposed remedy. Along the way, we will see that some the evidence she cites actually counts 
against her proposed remedy.  
3.1 Over-easy generalisations  
Leslie makes dramatic use of real-world case studies to show the perils of striking property 
generics. These are real-world historical examples in which people reasoned from a very few 
instances of bad behavior to condemnation of whole groups of people. Leslie uses these case 
studies to argue that the human mind has a powerful tendency to make such inferences when 
social groups are essentialised. She writes:  
Since we are working under the hypothesis that generics give voice to psychologically primitive 
generalizations, this observation implies that our basic way of dealing with dangerous or harmful 
information involves the rapid generalization of this information to the appropriate kind or 
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 It is worth noting that in Wodak, Leslie and Rhodes (2015) this position is clarified a bit (the forthcoming paper cited 
in the text was actually written earlier). Here it is noted that the position is not one of total abstinence regarding use of 
JHQHULFVIRUVRFLDOFDWHJRULHVDVFODLPVOLNH³GRFWRUVZHDUVFUXEV´LVXQSUREOHPDWLF/HVOLHDQGKHUFR-authors also 
note that abstinence would be insufficient, since non- generic statements are often recalled as generics. There is no 
suggestion, however, of any backing away from the thought that we should avoid the use of generics for social groups 
like racial and religious ones, which tend to be targets of prejudice.  
 
category. (Forthcoming: 4)  
The cases she discusses serve as powerful illustrations of this deeply pernicious tendency. They 
include anti-Muslim prejudice in the aftermath of September 11th; anti-Algerian prejudice in 
France in the 1920s, triggered by a single incident; and the way that English travelogues fuelled 
prejudice against both Africans and Native Americans. With their tales of racially motivated 
massacres and systematic discrimination, they show that this tendency to generalize from 
dangerous instances is of far more than merely intellectual interest. This is a vital matter of real-
world political significance. If use of generic sentences plays a role in bringing about these 
phenomena, and changing our language could make a difference, we certainly should work to 
change our language. Indeed, one comes away from LesOLH¶VSDSHUZLWKDYHU\KRSHIXOIHHOLQJ²
that she has identified a particularly pernicious form of speech, and that changing our speech 
could aid us enormously in the fight against prejudice.  
However, if this form of reasoning is, as Leslie repeatedly suggests it is, simply the way that our 
minds deal with information about danger, it is odd to focus so much on a particular form of 
words. As Leslie herself says:  
³7RUHFDSWKHQRXUPRVWSULPLWLYHJHQHUDOL]DWLRQVYRLFHGLQODQJXDJHDVJHQHULFVDUH
especially sensitive to information that is particularly striking, horrific, or appalling. When we 
encounter individuals engaging in such an act, we are naturally inclined to seek to generalize 
WKLVDFWLRQWRDNLQGWRZKLFKWKHLQGLYLGXDOVEHORQJV´/HVOLH)RUWhcoming: 22)  
,PSRUWDQWO\/HVOLH¶VFODLPKHUHLVWKDWwitnessing a single horrific incident will cause us to 
engage in pernicious generalizations. The cause of the pernicious generalization is simply 
knowledge of the single incident (combined, presumably with a tendency to essentialise the 
relevant kind). The generic language comes after the fact²it allows us to express the 
generalization that we have already made.  
(YHQ/HVOLH¶VRZQH[DPSOHVGRQRWFRQYLQFLQJO\VKRZWKDWVWULNLQJSURSHUW\generic statements 
play any key role in the horrific prejudices she discusses. Indeed, some of her own examples are 
RIRWKHUVRUWVRIXWWHUDQFHVOLNH6D[E\&KDPEOLVVVXJJHVWLQJWKDWWKHVKHULIIVKRXOG³DUUHVW
every Muslim tKDWFURVVHVWKHVWDWHOLQH´/HVlie Forthcoming: 11) a clear universal 
generalization. If Leslie is right that our minds tend to leap by default from single dangerous 
instances to very general beliefs, then we should expect this to happen regardless of the words 
that are used. And in fact she describes just this phenomenon in discussing the way that English 
colonial narratives fuelled prejudice against Africans: ³it would be overly simplistic to place the 
blame for the formation of early negative stereotypes squarely on the explorers. Many of them 
were quite responsible in their reporting, and did not indulge themselves in broad 
generalizations. Given the nature of our default system of generalization, they did not have to. 
The reporting of specific instances would suffice to encourage very general beliefs in the mind of 
the reader´/HVOLH forthcoming: 13-14). 
The stereotypical beliefs formed by the reader were, as Leslie herself notes, formed on the basis 
RILQGLYLGXDOLQVWDQFHVUHSRUWHG,WKLQN/HVOLHLVDEVROXWHO\ULJKWDERXWWKHPLQG¶VQDWXUDO
tendency to generalize from a few dangerous incidents. But if thLVLVULJKWWKHQLW¶VQRWDWDOOFOHDU
that avoidance of generic utterances would help to counteract this. We will remain just as likely 
to make these pernicious inferences about social groups, whether or not we hear the groups 
described with generic language. Reasoning from shocking incidents to sweeping 
generalisations is, as Leslie argues, simply what we do.  
In fact, there are two strands of thought in Leslie that are somewhat in tension. One strand 
focuses on our thought, and on our innate tendency to make pernicious generalisations about 
social groups on the basis of single incidents. The other strand focuses on the language in which 
we express such generalisations, suggesting that a reform of our language could reduce our 
tendency to perniciously generalize. But if the first is right, then the second seems very unlikely: 
if merely encountering single incidents causes us to generalize, then avoiding particular phrases 
by which we might express these generalisations will not be an effective remedy.  
3.2 Generics increase likelihood of essentialising  
Leslie makes use of several studies which purport to show that use of generics increase the 
likelihood that subjects²both children and adults²will essentialise a category. (See for example 
Cimpian and Markman 2009, 2011; Gelman, Wear and Kleinberg 2010.) It is beyond the scope 
of this paper to describe each of these studies in detail. However, one common feature that they 
share is that they contrast the effects of generic sentences (Fs have property P) with non-
generic sentences (This F has property P; This has property P). These studies show that after 
hearing/reading a generic sentence like Fs have property P, subjects are more likely to 
essentialise Fs than after hearing a non-generic sentence like This F has property P or This has 
property P ZKHUHLWLVFOHDUWKDWµWKLV¶SLFNVRXWDQ)7KLVLVVKRZQWKURXJKVHYHUDOPHDVXUHV
of essentialising, for example: a tendency to explain the presence of property P in terms of 
nature, function or stable trait; a tendency to infer that things with property P are likely to be F; a 
WHQGHQF\WRLQIHUWKDW)VZLOOVKDUHRWKHUSURSHUWLHVEHVLGHV3³DWHQGHQF\WRH[SHFWSURSHUWLHV
DVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHFDWHJRU\WREHLQQDWHRULQHYLWDEOH´5KRGHVHWDO:RUNWKDWLeslie 
herself was involved with shows that these findings extend to social, not just biological 
categories.  
However, these studies share a common flaw. They contrast Fs with This F or This.6 A claim 
that Fs have property P attributes a shared property to a greater number of Fs than a claim that 
a particular F has property P. If all that I know about Fs is that they share some property then it 
will seem (at least somewhat) reasonable to infer that Fs have a shared nature.7 By contrast, if 
DOOWKDW,NQRZDERXW)VLVWKDWRQHRIWKHPKDVVRPHSURSHUW\,¶OOEHPRUHKHVLWDQWWRDWWULEXWHD
shared nature to Fs. But there is no good reason to believe that generics are playing a key role 
here. It is entirely possible, given the evidence, that other attributions of a shared property would 
have exactly the same effect. Here are several alternative shared property attributions which 
might have the same effect, but which have not been tested:  
 Many Fs have property P ͒ 
 Most Fs have property P ͒͒͒ 
7KLV)KDVSURSHUW\3$QGWKLV)KDVSURSHUW\3$QGWKLV)KDVSURSHUW\3$QG«8 
If my supposition here is correct, then these property attributions may also lead to essentialising. 
And yet, they have not been tested.9 All that we know so far is that attributing a property to Fs is 
more likely to lead to essentialising than attributing a property to an F. It seems to me that this is 
an insufficient evidence base for inferring a special problem with generics and trying to re-phrase 
our utterances.  
But there is also a further problem with using This F has property P as our contrast item. I 
VXVSHFWWKDWWKLVIRUPRIZRUGVZLOODWOHDVWLQFRQWH[WVZKHUHZH¶UHEHLQJLQWURGXFHGWR)VFDUU\
the implicature that Fs with property P are not the norm. That is why it would be very strange for 
DFKLOGUHQ¶VERRNWRLQWURGXFHFDWVZLWKDVHQWHQFHOLNH³WKLVFDWKDVDWDLO´RUIRUPHWRWHOO\RX
that people on my street have heads. ,W¶V QRWDWDOOVWUDQJHIRUDFKLOGUHQ¶VERRNWRVD\³WKLVFDW
has black VSRWV´DQG,WKLQNWKLVLVEHFDXVHZKLOHWKH\¶UHQRWHVSHFLDOO\XQXVXDOVXFKFDWVDUH
not the norm. 1RZRIFRXUVHWKHSUHVHQFHRIDQLPSOLFDWXUHOLNHWKLVGRHVQ¶WPDNH\RXGRXEW
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 An exception to this is Gelman et. al. 2002, who contrDVWWKHJHQHULFZLWKµDOO¶DQGµVRPH¶ILQGLQJWKDWDUHFKLOGUHQ
DQGDGXOWVDUHPRVWOLNHO\WRPDNHLQGXFWLYHLQIHUHQFHIURPµDOO¶VWDWHPHQWVOHVVOLNHO\ZLWKJHQHULFVWDWHPHQWVDQG
OHVVOLNHO\VWLOOZLWKµVRPH¶VWDWHPHQWV7KLVVWXG\GRHVQRWWHVWWKHDlternatives suggested above. 
7
 This is especially likely if it is an unusual property, as it is in many of these studies (e.g. being afraid of ladybugs; 
disliking ice cream). 
8
 Thanks to Elena Hoicka for suggesting this alternative. 
9
 I am currently working with Elena Hoicka and Rachel Sterken to test these. 
that a kind you already know about is essentialised²\RX¶GVWLOOWKLQNFDts have a nature. But if 
\RXLQWURGXFHDQHZNLQGRQO\E\OLVWLQJSURSHUWLHVLQDZD\WKDWVXJJHVWVWKH\¶UHQRWW\SLFDOWKDW
PLJKWZHOOJLYHRQHSDXVHLQLQIHUULQJWRWKHH[LVWHQFHRIDQDWXUH&RQWUDVW³WKLVJOXNOLNHVWHD´
ZLWK³PRVWJOXNVOLNHWHD´After all, one would normally introduce a new kind by discussing 
typical properties. If one is instead listing off atypical properties, it would be reasonable to 
wonder if there are typical ones. This suggests, then, that This F has property P is an especially 
bad choice of contrast term for the generic claim.  
7KHREMHFWLRQVUDLVHGKHUHDUHQRWPHDQWWRGHIHDW/HVOLH¶VFODLPV$OO,KDYHGRQHLVWRUDLVH
some possibilities that I think need to be investigated before we can conclude that generics have 
the very particular role in essentialising that Leslie takes them to have. It seems to me that, for 
all we presently know, it may be a much broader class of constructions that play this role. This, 
then, is merely a demand for more research before we embrace LeVOLH¶VFRQFOXVLRQ 
3.3 Labels  
Leslie also makes use of studies on the use of labels. These are studies (e.g. Gelman and 
Heyman) that show children are more likely to do things which are closely related to 
essentialising when labels are used to describe someone. For example, if children are told 
³5RVLHLVDFDUURW-HDWHU´WKH\ZLOOWDNHWKHFDUURW-eating to be a far more stable property of 
5RVLH¶VWKDQLIWKH\DUHWROG³5RVLHHDWVFDUURWVZKHQHYHUVKHFDQ´6LQFHHVVHQWLDOising requires 
taking a kind to have a shared and stable nature, Leslie suggests that use of labels may promote 
essentialising, and that avoidance of them in discussing social groups might help to reduce 
essentialising. She finds further evidence of this in work by Waxman (2010), which shows that 
preschoolers presented with images of members of different racial groups are more likely to 
DVVLJQVLJQLILFDQFHWRUDFLDOFDWHJRULHVLIWKHSHRSOHDUHODEHOHGHJDVµD:D\VKDQ¶WKDQLI
they are merely described HJDVOLNLQJWR³SOD\DJDPHFDOOHGµ=DJJLW¶´ 
But if the evidence above is right, it is again a red herring to focus on use of generics²the 
problem is with labels for social groups. Granted, use of generics requires use of noun phrases 
(which labels are), but avoidance of generics will not succeed in bringing about avoidance of 
noun phrases for social groups. So it will give a false sense that one is helping to solve the 
problem, when one is not. Admittedly, Leslie argues for both avoiding social group generics and 
avoiding social group noun phrases. But by DYRLGLQJVRFLDOJURXSQRXQSKUDVHVZH¶OOEH
avoiding social group generics anyway. So discussing generics in this context seems a 
distraction. 
4. How racism is transmitted͒ 
An unartiFXODWHGDVVXPSWLRQXQGHUO\LQJ/HVOLHDQG+DVODQJHU¶VZRUNLVWKDWUDFLVPLVWRVRPH
significant extent, transmitted via utterances which make explicit reference to racial kinds, and 
attribute a dangerous property to members of these kinds. There is, of course, no doubt that 
such claims have been, and still are, made. At some times and in some places, these utterances 
may play a major role in the transmission of racist ideology.  
However, much racist ideology is transmitted without explicit mention of race.  Some of this is 
linguistic, as with the use of dogwhistle terms (Saul forthcoming, Stanley 2015). But a good deal 
of it will not be²a good deal of ideology is transmitted simply by living in a world structured by 
residential, occupational, and educational segregation (Anderson 2010). Crucially, this includes 
the transmission of racism to children. Indeed, many white parents believe that they should 
never mention race to their children (Vittrup and Holden 2011). These parents would never 
GUHDPRIXVLQJVHQWHQFHVOLNHLQFRQYHUVDWLRQZLWKWKHLUFKLOGUHQ/HVOLH¶VVXJJHVWLRQLVWKDW
by changing the language that we use to teach children about racial groups, we can fight racism. 
But now consider more carefully the nature of parent-child discussions of race. There are 
undoubtedly white explicitly racist parents who explicitly teach their children about race. 
However, these parents are not those well-PHDQLQJOLEHUDOSDUHQWVIRUZKRP/HVOLH¶VPHVVDJHLV
intended. Among well-meaning white liberal parents the problem is not the use of generics in 
discussing race.  Instead it is more likely to be the absence of race discussions, which could 
lead children to question the racially-structured world that they live in. Telling such parents to 
avoid the use of generics is unnecessary, and may only shore up their belief that discussions of 
race are so tricky that it would be better to avoid them.10 
5. The Benefits of Generic Language  
$OWKRXJK/HVOLHDQG+DVODQJHU¶VIRFXVLVRQWKH ways that generics can serve to perpetuate 
racism, sexism and other ills, it also seems to me worth noting the ways that they can serve to 
fight these ills. Here are some generic claims that campaigners for social justice might well want 
to make, as part of a social critique:  
(10) Women are expected to want children. 
(11) Black people face discrimination.͒ 
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 Black parents are far more likely to explicitly discuss race with their children, in order to make them aware of 
racism. But our focus here is on how the racism of white people is perpetuated. 
(12) Gay people are subjected to violence.  
(13) Muslims are profiled by airport security.͒ 
 
,ILW¶VLPSRUWDQWWRDYRLGWKHXVHRIJHQHULFVDERXWVRFLDOJURXSVWKHQLW¶VLPSRUWDQWWRDYRLG
WKHVHVRUWVRIVWDWHPHQWVWRR,IXVHRIJHQHULFVOHDGVWRHVVHQWLDOLVLQJWKHQZHVKRXOGQ¶WEH
using them at all. In fact, if Leslie is right about this, we should be especially wary of using them 
ZLWKFKLOGUHQ6RZHVKRXOGQ¶WVD\WKLQJVOLNH 
(14) Boys like pink too. ͒ 
(15) Girls play football. ͒ 
(16) Muslims are celebrating Eid, so wish your friend Ali a happy Eid! ͒ 
But these are quite clearly very good things to say to children. And, according to Leslie, they 
make use of a form of generalization that comes especially easily and naturally to children. 
Communicating with children and teaching them about the world is actually very challenging at 
times²especially when we are seeking to combat the prejudices that they see acted out in the 
world all around them. Depriving us of statements like (14)-(16) is depriving us of some very 
important weapons in our anti-prejudice arsenal. We may leap overly easily to reject generics 
entirely when we focus just on the nasty ones. We need to remember the good ones as well.  
6. Risks of Generic²and other-- Language  
6.1 Yes, there is a problem  
Despite all that I have argued above, however, I do think that use of generic language carries 
risks. These risks result, it seems to me, from a property of generics that both Leslie and 
Haslanger mention, but which is not the main focus for either of them. This is the difficulty that 
we have in thinking clearly about them. Both Haslanger and Leslie note that while we accept 
striking property generic statements on the basis of just a few instances, we make universal 
inferences very quickly on the basis of this acceptance. I would go further than this and note 
many ways in which we shift around in our interpretation of these claims²ways that render us 
very vulnerable to manipulation (and self-deception) by way of generics.  
It is very common, for example, for people to reassure themselves that they are not racist 
against black people by noting that racists dislike black people, and then remarking that they 
have a black friend. This involves starting from a generic claim which may seem reasonable 
WKRXJKLWLV,WKLQNEDVHGLQDQRYHUO\UHVWULFWLYHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIµUDFLVW¶DQGPRYLQJWRDQ
interpretation of this claim as a universal generalization. This last move is why it may seem²
wrongly² that citing a single black friend shows it to be false that one dislikes black people. 
More generally, it is too easy rhetorically to deny a true generalization made with a generic by 
citing a single counter-instance.  
 
6.2 But what is the correct solution?  
But it does not follow from this that the correct remedy is to avoid use of generics. They are 
useful in the cause of social justice, as I noted in the previous section. But, perhaps more 
LPSRUWDQWO\ZHZRQ¶WUHDOO\EHDEOHWRDYRLGWKHPLIWKH\GRLQIDFW³JLYHYRLFHWR´DGHIDXOWPode 
RIJHQHUDOL]DWLRQIRURXUPLQGV/HVOLHLQIDFWVXJJHVWVWKDWZHVKRXOGWU\WRHVFKHZµODEHOV¶DQG
RSWLQVWHDGIRUµGHVFULSWLRQV¶$QGLWPLJKWEHWUXHWKDWZKHQZHLQLWLDOO\UHSODFHµ0XVOLP¶ZLWK
µSHUVRQZKRIROORZV,VODP¶(a suggestion that she makes) ZH¶OOEHVORZHUWRDVFULEHDQHVVHQFH
But soon that phrase will simply be a label, and function as one.  
If generics are how we express a default mode of reasoning, we will start making generic claims 
ZLWKµSHUVRQZKRIROORZV,VODP¶7KHUHLVQRWHFKQLFal difficulty in constructing sentences like 
µ3HRSOHZKRIROORZ,VODPDUHWHUURULVWV¶$QGWKLVLVQRWMXVWDVSHFXODWLYHSRLQW,WLVZRUWK
UHIOHFWLQJDOVRRQKRZQRWDEO\XQVXFFHVVIXOLWZDVWRUHSODFHWKHQRXQµPRURQ¶ZLWKWKH
GHVFULSWLYHSKUDVHµPHQWDOO\UHWDUGHGSHUVRQ¶7KHPRUHUHFHQWWHUPVµVSHFLDOQHHGV¶DQG
µSHUVRQZLWKVSHFLDOQHHGV¶DOVRSURYLGHDUHYHDOLQJFDVHVWXG\,QGHHGWKHGULYHWRODEHOJURXSV
ZLWKQRXQSKUDVHVKDVOHGWKHQRXQSKUDVHµVSHFLDOQHHGV¶WREHXVHGDVDQDGMHFWLYHLQµVSHFLDl 
QHHGVFKLOGUHQ¶(YHQZKHQLW¶VLQLWLDOO\XQJUDPPDWLFDOZHZLOOILQGDZD\WRIRUPWKHHDV\QRXQ
phrases that facilitate essentialising. Reflecting on cases like these should give one pause about 
the efficacy of attempting to reduce essentialising through this sort of linguistic reform.  
So, it seems to me, we VKRXOGQ¶Wtry to avoid generics. Instead, we need to get better at talking 
and thinking about them. We need to press people to spell out their evidence for their generic 
claims and to reflect on ZKDWWKDWHYLGHQFHUHDOO\GRHVRUGRHVQ¶WZDUUDQW6XSSRVHWKDW$
DVVHUWVµ0XVOLPVDUHWHUURULVWV¶%FRXOGDVNDQ\RIWKHIROORZLQJ 
 A few Muslims are terrorists. But so are a few Christians. Remember Timothy McVeigh? ͒ 
 Why do you think that? How many terrorist Muslims do you know about out of the more than a 
billion in the world? ͒ 
 Do you have any evidence that being Muslim makes you more likely to be a terrorist? ͒ 
Doing this is similar to what Haslanger suggests, and indeed one could even use metalinguistic 
negation: ͒ 
1R0XVOLPVDUHQRWWHUURULVWV$IHZWHUURULVWVZKRDUHPHPEHUVRIWKHJURXSDUHQ¶WHQRXJKWR
justify what you said.  
+RZHYHUWKHVWUDWHJ\LVQRWFRQILQHGWRPHWDOLQJXLVWLFQHJDWLRQDQGLW¶VQRWPRWLYDWHGE\WKH
thought that there is an implicature about natures in need of cancellation.  
 
6.3 Applying the solution more broadly͒ 
Importantly, we need to be equally concerned about other, non-generic gratuitous uses of kind 
WHUPV,IDQDFWRIWHUURULVPZDVH[SOLFLWO\FDUULHGRXWLQWKHQDPHRI,VODPWKHQWKHUH¶VQRGRXEW
that the perpetrator being Muslim is relevant WRZKDW¶VEHLQJ reported, and so noting this fact 
should not be criticized. (Of course, it would nonetheless be very important to avoid 
overgeneralizations, whether generic in form or otherwise.) However, social kind membership is 
often mentioned ZKHQLW¶VQRWUHOHYDQWThis has been documented especially well with respect 
to race and crime (Anderson 2010:56). This also makes us vulnerable to manipulation and plays 
an important role in perpetuating prejudice. We all too easily slide²as Leslie would predict²
from these indiYLGXDOLQVWDQFHVWREHOLHIVDERXWWKHJURXSZKHWKHUZHXVHJHQHULFVOLNHµEODFNV¶
to express the beliefs or non-JHQHULFVOLNHµPDQ\EODFNV¶RUµPRVWEODFNV¶ 
Importantly, though we may not even form beliefs (consciously or unconsciously) in the relevant 
propositions. Instead, we may well form implicit biases.  On most theories, these are not beliefs, 
but something more like patterns of associations, which nonetheless lead us to biased 
judgments. A classic case of this would be the well-documented Weapon Bias: we are more 
likely to judge an ambiguous object to be a gun when it appears in the hand of a black man than 
a white man; these biased judgments correlate with our levels of implicit bias against black men 
(Payne 2006). Implicit bias is largely an unconscious phenomenon, and it is a crucial part 
(though only a part) of the prejudice we see in action in the world. Blocking certain means of 
expressing prejudice²YLDJHQHULFVVXFKDV³EODFNPHQDUHYLROHQW´ZRXOGQRWGRPXFKDWDOOWR
combat implicit bias.11 Many of those who harbour these associations are unaware of them, and 
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 ,GRQ¶WPHDQWRVXJJHVWWKDW/HVOLHWDNHVKHUVROXWLRQWREHDFXUH-all for prejudice. She does not. However, the 
importance of implicit bias in our world enhances my worry that avoiding generics is a misdirection of our energy. 
therefore not likely to seek out ways of expressing them. So rather than focus on how biases are 
expressed, we need to fight the biases.  
However, the utterances that we are exposed to probably do make a difference to the formation 
and perpetuation of these biases. What matters about these utterances, though, is not likely to 
be whether they contain generics or not. What matters is, for example, the tendency to mention 
the race of criminals when the criminals are black, and not when they are white. There are at 
least two ways in which this could contribute to the formation of implicit biases. One²less likely-
- would be via the implicature mechanism that I discussed earlier: the reporter has mentioned 
that the mugger was black. They must think this is relevant. They know their facts, so blackness 
must be connected to the crime. But this is unlikely.12 7KHUH¶VQRWKLQJUHPDUNDEOHDERXWUDFH
being mentioned in this way in a crime report (indeed it is the norm to mention race of 
SHUSHWUDWRUZKHQWKH\DUHEODFNVRZHZRQ¶WIHHODQHHGWRUHDVRQDERXWZK\LWZRXOGEH
KDSSHQLQJ:KDW¶VIDUPRUHOLNHO\WRKDSSHQLVWKDWPHQWLRQLQJUDFHZKHQFULPLQDOVDre black 
leads us to associate blackness with criminality²whether we formulate this as a belief or not. 
(Leslie would predict that just a very few mentions would suffice for this effect, but in fact we will 
have been exposed to far more than a few such instances.) And this association, we know from 
decades of work on implicit bias discussed earlier, is far from benign.  
In order to take action on this, we need to start speaking up about these gratuitous mentions of 
race:  
 Why did they mention that mugger was black? Is that meant to be relevant? ͒ 
 :K\VKRXOGZHFDUHDERXWWKHPXJJHU¶VUDFH"͒ 
 :K\GRQ¶WZHHYHUKHDUPHQWLRQVRIUDFHZKHQZKLWHSHRSOHDUHFULPLQDOV"͒ 
My view, then, is that we would be making a mistake to focus our efforts on generics. Instead, 
we need to think hard about all mentions of gender, race and the like. We need to call attention 
WRWKHPDQGDVNZKHWKHUWKH\¶UHUHOHYDQWGHPDQGHYLGHQFHIRUFODLPVTXHVWLRQLQIHUHQFHVDQG
so on. We definitely should do these things when generics are used. But we should also do them 
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 Of course, an implicature can arise without the calculation actually taking place. However, the calculation has to be 
part of a rational reconstruction of how the belief that blackness is connected to crime is arrived at. That is, it has to be 
that taking the speaker to believe this is required to make sense of her utterance as cooperative² even if the 
DXGLHQFHGRHVQ¶WUHDVRQH[SOLFLWO\DERXWZKDW¶VUHTXLUHGWRXQGHUVWDQGKHUDVFRRSHUDWLYH$QGLW¶VMXVWQRWWUXHWKDW
this is required to understand the speaker as cooperative²mentioning blackness of criminals when reporting on crime 
LVVXFKDQRUPWKDWLW¶VVLPSO\IROORZLQJWKHFRQYHQWLRQVRIWKHJHQUH 
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